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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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In this paper, we present a new estimation of the euroisation level of the Albanian 
economy taking into account both foreign deposits and foreign currency in 
circulation. We implement a recent novel methodology to calculate foreign 
currency in circulation. It is found that the overall level of euroisation including 
this often unaccounted measure is approximately 45 percent of total money. We 
also try to investigate some of the implications the re-estimated level of 
euroisation has on the actual monetary policy and the future path towards EMU.  
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1. Introduction 
Dollarisation and the more recent Euroisation are important phenomena that 
have inspired a large literature, especially after the financial crises of the 1990s 
and the increasingly spontaneous use of foreign currencies in domestic 
economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa.1 Porter and Judsson 
(1996) estimate that 40-60% of the US dollar circulates outside the USA, while 
according to Doyle (2000) approximately 35-70% of DM were out of Germany 
before the Euro was released. Most of this currency is circulating in transition 
economies as foreign currency deposits and cash. In this paper, we measure the 
level of foreign currency substitution (dollarisation and euroisation) in Albania 
and evaluate its implications for the actual monetary policy and for the eventual 
process of joining the EMU. In Albania, both dollarisation and euroisation are 
present, although there are signs that the Euro is more widespread. Therefore, 
throughout this paper, the term euroisation refers to the use of both Euros and 
US dollars. 
 
In the literature, there are different measures of euroisation, which reflect 
different types of euroisation and data constraints. A widely used euroisation 
measure is the percentage of foreign currency deposits to total deposits (asset 
euroisation). According to this indicator Albania appears to have a moderate level 
of euroisation of less than 30 percent, compared to some other transition 
countries like Macedonia FYR and Romania. Nevertheless, the foreign currency 
deposits ratio does not capture the whole scale of euroisation. In transition 
economies like Albania, it is very common for transactions to take place outside 
of the banking channels, and the cash economy is quite widespread. 
Furthermore, foreign currency in circulation (FCC) is a major component of cash 
in circulation especially in emerging economies.2 Therefore, it is necessary to 
include FCC to obtain a more accurate measurement of euroisation. This change 
in the measurement should influence the results and lead to a different scenario. 
In an early attempt, Sojli (2004) finds that euroisation in Albania, including FCC, 
could be higher than 36 percent (of total money3) by the end of 2002. 
 
In order to measure FCC, estimates of both consumer and business use of foreign 
currency are important. Thus far, the latter has received little attention, partly 
due to the level of informality which constrains data availability on how 
businesses carry out their activities in Albania. To overcome the problem of 
insufficient coverage of official data on foreign currency substitution, we drew on 
a survey where both consumers and businesses were asked on how much they 
rely on foreign currency vs. Albanian Lek for different purposes. We find that 
foreign currencies are barely used in daily transactions by individuals, while they 
constitute more than 60 percent of revenues for many businesses. The mismatch 
                                                 
1 For further reference please refer to Winkler et al. (2004) and references therein. 
2 Calvo and Vegh (1992), Feige (2002) and Feige et al. (2000, 2002) highlight the importance of 
foreign currency in circulation in emerging economies. 
3 Total money is the sum of broad money and foreign currency in circulation. See section 3 for a 
longer explanation.  -  3  - 
between individual and business euroisation might arise due to the different 
nature of the consumption basket of individuals, where food constitutes about 70 
percent, and the businesses that we have surveyed (services, construction and 
manufacturing), which represent 75 percent of GDP. Furthermore, there appears 
to be a stark mismatch between the foreign assets and liabilities of companies.  
 
Based on this new businesses’ survey data, we estimate that the current level of 
euroisation in Albania could be as high as 45 percent of total money (broad 
money and foreign currency in circulation) or even more. As credit is still being 
provided mostly in foreign currency, this ratio is expected to increase further as 
financial intermediation deepens. Regarding its implications for monetary policy, 
it weakens the interest rate channel, given that a large part of the decision related 
to interest rate are taken in foreign currency while central bank becomes very 
sensitive to exchange rate developments independently of the regime in place. 
The benefits of adopting officially Euro sooner rather than later are large in terms 
of closing the door to possible crisis and speculative attacks that could occur 
under some forms of pegging. However, the process of joining EMU may take 
unnecessarily long time after entering EU, forgoing its stabilisation advantage. 
Therefore we advocate a ‘consensual’ early euroisation for highly euroised 
countries like Albania in order to gain the benefits of the Euro when most needed.   
  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a short overview of 
the Albanian economy. The third section addresses and investigates issues 
related to the measurement of euroisation. A discussion of the implications of 
euroisation for the Albanian economy and evaluation of the possibility of 
unilateral euroisation of Albania under the “traditional” and “new” OCA criteria, 
follows in the forth section. Section five presents some conclusions of our 
research. 
  
2. A quick overview of Albanian economy 
Following the crisis of 1997-1998, the Albanian economy has been growing 
relatively fast, due to policies for economic stabilisation and a period of relative 
political stability. Overall, there are encouraging signs for further strengthening 
of macroeconomic equilibrium. Over the past seven years, the economy has 
experienced considerable growth in real terms, the domestic currency has been 
more stable and even appreciating, and inflation has been kept at modest levels 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Main economic indicators 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Real GDP growth (%)  12.7  8.9 7.7 7.0 2.9 5.7 5.9 
GDP per capita (in usd)  842.1  1052.0  1086.3  1329.0  1460.0  1833.5  2,434 
Unemployment  rate  (%)  17.8  18.0 16.9 14.6 15.8 15.0 14.6 
Inflation rate (end year, in %)  8.7  -1.0  4.2  3.5  2.1  2.9  2.2 
Debt–exports ratio (in %)  358  187  166  143  129  128  -- 
(In percent of GDP)  -  4  - 
General govt. balance (excluding grants)  -11.4  -12.1  -9.2 -8.2 -6.9 -5.6  -- 
Domestic  debt  36.2  37.4 42.6 41.0 41.7 41.1 38.5 
Trade balance  -22.8  -19.3 -21.6 -22.5 -25.9 -25.1 -21.8 
Current account balance (excl.  grants)  -7.1  -7.9  -7.4  -5.8  -10.0  -8.1  -5.5 
External  debt  36.9  32.3 31.8 26.6 23.3 20.7 18.0 
Foreign direct investment  1.6  1.2 3.7 5.1 3.0 3.2 4.6 
(In nominal terms) 
Exchange  rate  lek/usd  (av.)  150.6  137.7 143.7 143.5 140.1 121.9 102.9 
Exchange rate lek/euro (av.)  --  146.96 132.58 128.47 132.36 137.51 127.67 
Source: Ministry of Finance, INSTAT, Bank of Albania 
 
The real GDP growth rate in 2003 and 2004 recovered to its trend of 5.7 percent 
and 5.9 percent respectively from 2.9 in 2002. This growth is mainly due to 
growth in the services sector. The latest data issued by Albanian Institute of 
Statistics (INSTAT) show a large structural shift from agriculture to services 
(Table 2). Agriculture accounts for less than one-forth of the economy, while 
services have reached 46 percent of GDP, and there are signs that this structural 
change will deepen in the future. While to some extent this is a sign of 
development, the lack of investment and restructuring in the agriculture sector 
has accelerated its fall. 
 
Table 2: Origin of GDP (% of total) 
  2001 2002  2003  2004 
Agriculture 26.0 25.4  24.7  21.8 
Industry 10.8 10.5  10.2  14.5 
Construction 8.3 8.6  9.1  9.5 
Services 45.7 45.9  46.1  45.2 
Transport 9.1 9.6  10.0  9.0 
 Source: Ministry of Finance, INSTAT, Bank of Albania 
 
The strong growth performance has had a positive impact on the unemployment 
rate, which has fallen to 14.6 percent in 2004 from 18 percent in 1998-1999, 
although these statistics should be treated with caution. Economic activity is 
mostly concentrated in small companies and farms and the informality in the 
labour market, especially among SME, is very high.4  
 
The fiscal stance has continuously improved, due to significant fiscal adjustments 
in the recent years. In 2003, the size of budget deficit (excluding grants) reduced 
to 4.4 percent of GDP, which is close to that of the ten EU new member countries 
(the average deficit was 4.7 percent of GDP in 2002). Yet, there is a strong need 
for further improvements in the fiscal position, given the low level of government 
revenues compared to GDP, which remain the lowest among the countries in the 
region. In addition, the resumption of lending activity by Raiffeisen Bank, that 
holds more than 80 percent of government T-bills, will increase the pressure for 
improving the alternative sources of financing the budget deficit in the future. 
 
                                                 
4 According to INSTAT, around 98 percent of enterprises in Albania have ten or less employees.  -  5  - 
Ongoing reforms to enhance the efficiency of tax administration combined with a 
concerted effort to reduce the size of the informal economy, which is estimated to 
be one of the highest in the region, is expected to increase tax revenues as a share 
of GDP and permit an expansion of priority expenditure within a framework of 
further fiscal consolidation. As this consolidation takes place and the business 
sector takes on an bigger role, public and private consumption will decline as 
share of GDP.  
 
Table 3: General government budgets 
% of GDP  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Total  revenues  22.0 22.0 21.9 23.0 22.9 22.4 
-  Tax  revenues  12.3 12.9 15.6 15.6 15.7 19.6 
Expenditure  30.2 33.3 30.9 31.5 29.1 26.9 
- Capital Expenditure  5.7  5.8  6.6  7.4  5.6  4.1 
Budget deficit  -11.3  -11.3  -9.1  -8.6  -6.2  -4.4 
-Domestically financed  6.5 5.0 5.4 4.8 3.2 3.2 
- Externally financed  4.8  6.3  3.7  3.8  3.0  1.2 
Source: Ministry of Finance, INSTAT, Bank of Albania 
 
In terms of price stability, Albania has shown impressive results (Figure 1). 
Inflation has been generally lower in comparison to other transition economies. 
Monetary policy continues to aim inflation within a 2-4 percent target. However, 
Albania’s reliance on monetary targeting, which has not experienced any serious 
problem so far, may prove to be insufficient to maintain low inflation in the 
future. In particular, the signalling power of monetary aggregates targeted by the 
Bank of Albania (BoA) may start to deteriorate. Therefore, alternative regimes 
such as inflation targeting that could transmit central bank signals better are 
being considered. However, several external threats that may prevent the bank 
from reaching the target, independently from the regime in place should be borne 
in mind. Among other threats, the impact of euroisation on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, is often cited. 
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With regards to the financial system development, the privatisation of largest 
bank in Albania, the Savings Bank, has been a catalyst for the recent increase in 
credit to the private sector, which still remains the lowest among transition 
countries. In the last couple of years there has been also a boost in the range of 
instruments that commercial banks offer to the public, like credit cards and 
provision of ATMs that deliver money in different currencies.  
 
On the external side, large inflows of current transfers and positive service 
balances in recent years have helped dampen the rising trade deficits and 
resulted in a slight improvement in the balance of payments position, Figure 2. 
Although current account deficits have been large throughout most of the 
transition period, only recently its size has become a matter of concern. The 
current account deficit may still be sustainable in the short run, however its long 
run sustainability may be questionable if certain measures, such as structural 
reform that boost export competitiveness are not undertaken. Over the medium 
term, as the business climate improves, growth should be driven by rising foreign 
and domestic export-oriented investment. 
 


























Current Account deficit Trade deficit Official Transfers  
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Albania follows a floating exchange rate regime with interventions in the foreign 
exchange market restricted to maintain a certain level of international reserves. 
F r o m  F i g u r e  3 ,  w e  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h r e e  periods in the Albanian Lek movement 
against hard currencies. Although the exchange rate pass-through is quite high, 
especially during depreciation periods, BoA so far has been reluctant to rely on 
direct interventions to meet its inflation targets. This is partly because of changes 
in fundamentals in periods of strong depreciations (1997) and the inadequate 
level of international reserves. From 2001 the exchange rate has shown 




Figure 3: Nominal and real effective exchange rate estimates for the Lek (80% Euro 
and 20% USD).  -  7  - 
 
Source:  Bank of Albania 
 
Despite the significant macroeconomic achievements, the Albanian economy is 
still fragile and considerable progress is needed to establish an attractive 
framework favourable to investment and sustainable growth, driven by private 
sector development. Although Albania is well positioned to attract foreign direct 
investments, with its favourable geographical location, competitive salaries, and 
natural resources, foreign investors have been reluctant to commit their 
resources in an uncertain business environment (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Western Balkans – FDI Inflows. 1997 - 2003  
 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Average 
1997-2003 
Per capita - euro  
Albania    14 13 12 50 74 46  42    36 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina    0 13 36 40 37 61  71    37 
Croatia    106 187 310 266 392 234  282    254 
Macedonia    7 53 15 96  247 41  20    68 
Serbia  and  Montenegro    81 12 13  3 23 74 144    50 
Western Balkans 
 
  55  52  78  79  129  98  133   89 
% of GDP  
Albania   2.2  1.5  1.1  3.7 4.9 2.8  2.7    2.7 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   0.0  1.3 3.3 3.2 2.7 4.4  4.9    2.8 
Croatia   2.6  4.3  7.4  5.9 8.0 4.6  6.2    5.6 
Macedonia    0.4 3.3 0.9 4.9 12.9  2.1  1.1    3.6 
Serbia and Montenegro   4.4  0.8 1.1 0.3 1.4 3.6  6.3    2.6 
Western Balkans 
 
  2.9  2.7  4.3  4.1  5.7  3.9  5.4   4.1 
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3. Euroisation Measurement 
After a short overview of the Albanian economy and its specific characteristics, 
we now turn to the measurement of euroisation. The relevant literature proposes 
several methods of measuring euroisation (see Box 1), but two of these measures 
that have become the benchmark are asset and liability euroisation. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) uses a form of asset substitution, the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to broad money (M3), as a proxy for euroisation. 
Foreign currency liabilities are given out from foreign currency deposits hence, 
they are implicitly included in this euroisation measure. It is suggested that if 
asset euroisation is lower than 30 percent, then it does not interfere with 
monetary policy transmission channels (Baliño et al, 1999).  
 
DIIMF = 
Foreign Currency Deposits        (1) 
                             Broad Money 
 
Box 1: Different types of euroisation/dollarisation 
  
1. Financial (asset) euroisation/dollarisation 
When a portion of financial assets held by the private sector, as a store of value, are 
denominated in foreign currency. 
 
2. Currency substitution 
When a portion of financial assets held by the private sector for transaction purposes is 
denominated in foreign currency. 
 
3. Liability euroisation/dollarisation  
Currency substitution of liabilities generally refers to the extensive use of foreign 
currency denominated bank loans. 
 
4. Real euroisation/dollarisation 
occurs when key prices such as wages, but also those of goods, are indexed to a foreign 
currency, but actual payment takes place in local currency. The everyday transactions 
take place mostly in local currency. Real estate and durable goods are usually quoted in 
foreign denominated currency. 
 
Given the characteristics of the Albanian economy mentioned above: high 
uncertainty; high foreign inflows; and high market informality, asset euroisation 
is a biased proxy for currency substitution and does not provide a real estimate of 
the presence of foreign currency in the economy. The high rate of money 
circulating outside banks,5 and the low rate of import payments through bank 
accounts, 40-44 percent on average in the last years,6 imply a large circulation of 
foreign currency in cash. Thus, we adopt a wider definition of euroisation, which 
includes foreign currency in circulation outside banks. 
 
The euroisation index (EI) is calculated as:  
                                                 
5 The ratio of cash in circulation to M3 has been historically above 30 percent declining to 25 percent in 
2005. 
6 Net export payments settled through the banking system are calculated from the Balance of 
Payments section, in the Bank of Albania.  -  9  - 
 
EI = 
Foreign Currency in Circulation + Foreign Currency Deposits       (2) 
                                Total Money 
 
where, Total Money = Broad Money + Foreign Currency in Circulation and  
 
Broad Money = Domestic Currency Deposits (DCD) + Foreign Currency Deposits 
(FCD) + Domestic Cash in Circulation (DCC). 
 
The euroisation index can be separated in two components, asset substitution 
index (ASI) and currency substitution index (CSI), which are calculated as:  
 
ASI = 
Foreign Currency Deposits         (3) 
                  Total deposits 
 
CSI = 
       Foreign Currency in Circulation                     _        (4) 
             Currency Outside Bank (domestic and foreign) 
 
3.1 Asset Substitution Index  
ASI is relatively easy to measure, because data on deposits is available from the 
central banks or the International Financial Statistics. This segment of the 
euroisation index is comparable with the IMF measure, since they are both based 
on FCD. From Figure 4, we observe a continuous and substatial increase in both 
asset substitution and IMF index for the period after June 2003. DIIMF has 
reached its highest level ever in Albania, 27.1 percent, in September 2005, while 
ASI is at its highest level, since July 1997. The rapid increase in foreign currency 
deposits appears to be mainly due to the increase in the level of deposits that 
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Source:  Bank of Albania   - 10 - 
 
We notice that there is a very high degree of correlation, 72 percent, between ASI 
and DIIMF, and the fluctuations in the ASI have been much higher than in 
DIIMF. Any differences in fluctuations between the two indexes would be caused 
by fluctuations in broad money and total deposits. Thus, it can be inferred that 
total deposits have higher volatility than broad money and individuals shift their 
portfolios between cash and deposits often. 
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Source:  Bank of Albania 
 
In contrast with other countries in the region, Albania exhibits a moderate level 
of foreign deposits as a share of total deposits and of broad money (Tables 5 and 
6). Countries like Bulgaria and Croatia exhibit much lower euroisation of 
deposits, even though estimated foreign currency in circulation is very high in 
these countries (Table 7).  
 
Table 5: Share of foreign deposits to total deposits (in %) 
COUNTRY  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005* 
Albania  25.5   27.5   30.0   32.4   31.1   31.3   33.2  
Bulgaria  56.1   66.3   62.6   47.1   32.5   26.7   26.2  
Croatia  23.7   29.0   27.6   25.4   25.3   31.4   27.0  
Hungary  19.5   18.2   17.5   16.5   14.1   15.5   14.8  
Macedonia  83.4   87.6   70.3   64.2   56.5   48.6   45.4  
Latvia  118.5   137.7   139.0   129.8   130.4   131.3   122.4  
Lithuania  21.1   35.4   32.8   25.6   20.0   24.9   30.4  
Romania  75.5   85.6   103.6   89.4   82.3   71.4   62.8  
Slovenia  23.0   24.0   27.6   27.4   16.9   16.4   18.3  
Source: International Financial Statistics Database   
*Until August 2005 
 
Table 6: Share of foreign deposits to broad money (in %) 
COUNTRY  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005* 
Albania  18.7   19.6   21.3   22.1   22.4   23.1   24.8  
Bulgaria  40.8   46.7   42.5   32.4   22.7   18.8   19.2  
Croatia  21.3   26.4   25.3   23.2   23.2   28.9   24.7    - 11 - 
Hungary  16.4   15.4   14.9   13.9   11.9   13.3   12.7  
Macedonia  61.3   67.6   54.8   51.3   45.4   40.4   38.4  
Latvia  74.8   91.5   96.1   92.8   95.3   100.8   96.8  
Lithuania  14.3   25.6   25.1   19.5   14.7   18.7   23.6  
Romania  37.5   39.9   44.2   41.3   39.2   36.2   33.8  
Slovenia  21.5   22.5   26.1   26.0   16.1   15.5   17.4  
Source: International Financial Statistics Database 
*Until August 2005 
 
3.2 Foreign Currency in Circulation 
Calculating the currency substitution index is difficult due to the need to measure 
FCC. Calvo and Vegh (1992) portray the following picture: “Often data on foreign 
currency circulating in an economy do not exist. Hence the importance of 
currency substitution is unobservable.” To estimate FCC several methods of 
measurement have been proposed using: money transfers (Feige, 2002; Feige et 
al., 2000, 2002); currency exchanges (Mongardini and Mueller, 2000); and 
macroeconomic factors (Reinhart et al., 2003). 
 
Table 7:  Foreign Currency in Circulation for transition economies  
COUNTRY 
FCC Per Capita  2001  (FCC as % of total 
currency) 
Albania  46  14  
Bulgaria  125  41  
Croatia  117  35  
Hungary  25  6  
Macedonia  5  5  
Latvia  1209  79  
Lithuania  25  11  
Romania  61  55  
Slovenia  329  54  
Source: Feige 2002, page 13 
Feige (2002) uses reports and surveys from the country of origin of the money 
(US and Germany) on the destination of the currency once it moves out. He 
estimates that FCC in Albania was 14% in 2001 (Table 7), which is not very high 
compared to other countries in the region. Nonetheless, the exact location of 
dollars and euros is difficult to determine, because money might have circulated 
out the country where it was originally sent. Hence, this method of FCC 
estimation has considerable limitations.  
 
Sojli (2004), based on the internal circulation of money, suggests that FCC ought 
to be calculated as: 
 
FCC = exchanges + transfers + customs        (5) 
These are all flow (net) variables, thus the knowledge of the stock of FCC in the 
beginning of the estimation period is needed. Sojli (2004) assumes that FCC in 
1998 is the sum of the net remittances that have been transferred through 
Western Union from 1995 until 1998. This estimate is not very accurate because: 
first, any foreign currency coming to Albania between 1991 and 1995 is not 
accounted for and second, official channels of money transfers, like Western   - 12 - 
Union or banks, were not widely used before 1998. Individuals preferred bringing 
the money personally in cash.  
 
To estimate the current level of the stock of FCC in the Albanian economy, we 
conducted a survey of both individuals and businesses, in September 2005. 
Individuals were asked about their use of foreign currency for transaction and 
saving purposes, while businesses were asked about their overall use of foreign 
currency in day to day management of the firm and their expectations for the 
future (see surveys presented in Appendix A and B). More specifically, we asked 
both individuals and businesses on their level of savings and foreign currency 
holdings as a percentage of total savings/capital and total cash holdings. In this 
way, we can estimate the amount of foreign currency in circulation, without 
having to ask them for their exact amount of cash holdings. Once the initial stock 
level of FCC has been determined, then the measure of FCC can be updated 
periodically by the above set formula and included in the euroisation index. This 
will help the Central Bank to keep track of the level and trends in euroisation in 
the economy.  
 
Given the inequality of wealth distribution in Albania, currency substitution 
could vary significantly among different wealth groups. For this reason, we take 
into account several wealth groups from the population based on the household 
survey of 2001 (Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), INSTAT). We 
assume that income/wealth and cash holding have the same distribution. While 
wealth and income normally differ from each-other, since the market economy is 
only fifteen years old in Albania, the differences between the distribution of 
income, wealth, and cash holdings should not be high. 
 
Based on Yefimova et al. (1998) and Ionin et al. (1998), we calculate that a sample 
of 2260 respondents would be appropriate for the purpose of this survey, 1635 
individuals and 625 businesses. The majority of the individuals, 23.5 percent, and 
41 percent of businesses were chosen from Tirana, given that it is the capital and 
the most densely populated area of the country. Nonetheless, there is a significant 
and fair representation of the rest of the country in the sample and rural areas are 




From the survey results (Table 8), we observe that virtually all individuals carry 
out their transactions in local currency. Only one respondent out of the whole 
sample claims that part of his/her expenditures is in foreign currency. This is in 
line with what a similar survey, in 2003, revealed: which is, most or all of daily 
transactions take place in local currency. 
 
With regards to the distribution of households’ portfolios, results again are not 
far from our existing knowledge on this issue (Table 8). 58 percent of individuals’ 
liquidity is kept as cash in Leks. Lek deposits make up almost 36 percent of 
individuals’ portfolios. The share of foreign currency holdings in cash is just over 
1 percent, reflecting their low use in everyday transactions. Foreign currency   - 13 - 
deposits make up merely 5.6 percent of the portfolio which is much lower than 
what is held by the banking system in Table 5 and Figure 7.  
 
Table 8:  Lek vs. Foreign currency preference  






Lek cash  57.61   40.0  - 
Lek dep.  35.51   37.7  3.5 
FX cash  1.13   2.6  - 
FX dep.  5.62   11.7  2.8 
T-bills 0.12    2.0  2.4 
  
The preference of relying mostly or exclusively on Lek is also confirmed to 
continue in the next 3 years. However, this preference could be fragile and 
subject to changes, if interest rate differentials between Lek and foreign currency 
deposits narrowed further.7 Individuals seem to be fairly alert to all types of 
interests. 
 
From Table 8, we infer that foreign currency in circulation constitutes 1.13 
percent of individual savings (DCC+FCD+DCD+FCC). This allows us to calculate 
the amount of foreign currency in circulation, which is estimated to be 6,470 
million Leks. This figure is much lower than the one that Sojli (2004) estimates 
and is mainly due to the fact that foreign currency is not used for small day to day 




We surveyed businesses from the services, construction and manufacturing 
sector, which constitute 75.1% of GDP. The results in Table 5 show that foreign 
currency dependence of businesses is much higher compared to households on 
both liability and asset sides. Revenues in foreign currency amount to more than 
65 percent of the total revenue, and they are 50 percent or higher for each of the 
sectors investigated. This comes as a bit of a surprise after having found that 
consumers pay mostly in Leks. One explanation could be that the output of these 
businesses constitutes a small share of consumers’ basket and is paid from 
savings. As a matter of fact, almost 70 percent of the Albanian consumer basket 
consists of food which is provided to a large extent by the agriculture sector not 
included in our business sample. Nonetheless, we may say there is a sample 
demand and supply mismatch. 
 
Furthermore, from Table 9, we notice that firms incur costs in foreign currency, 
but they are not as high as revenues. A large share of assets and liabilities is held 
in foreign currency as well, and liabilities in foreign currency are higher than 
assets, especially for service businesses. On the other hand, almost 50 percent of 
the capital of these firms is held in foreign currency, which might mitigate the 
problems arising due to the discrepancy between foreign assets and liabilities. 
 
                                                 
7 In September 2005, the spread between Euro and Lek deposits rages between 1.68 – 3.19 
percent for one and twelve month deposits, respectively.   - 14 - 
Table 9:  Share of foreign currency (as a percentage of the total) 
  Total  Manufacturing  Construction  Services 
Revenues   65.3  72.0  55.7  49.8 
Expenditures 40.4  46.9  26.1  25.1 
Assets 39.28  45.0  18.3  40.0 
Liabilities 42.27  47.2  25.5  51.0 
Capital 49.37  52.1  32.6  73.3 
Currency mismatch  41.0      
 
Comparing the foreign currency share of revenues against that of expenditures or 
assets vs. liabilities there does not seem to be any dire mismatch to justify 
concerns of ‘fear of floating’. Nonetheless, looking at the disaggregated currency 
mismatch measure (sum of absolute value of revenue-expenditure difference for 
each firm) of 41 percent, the picture gets more concerning. While this is a very 
basic exercise, which needs more accurate quantitative corroboration, it points to 
a potentially serious flaw of the actual flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
Businesses seem to lean toward more usage of foreign currency in the future - 30 
percent expect euroisation to grow, 10 percent to decline and 58 percent to 
remain the same. This trend, however, seems to be slowing down compared to 
the historical behaviour of euroisation – 48 percent report an increase in euro 
usage, 9 percent a decrease, 42 percent no change. Finally, a large portion of 
businesses (62 percent) would prefer the adoption of euro. 
 
We use the foreign currency share of revenues and expenses, to calculate the 
amount of foreign cash that businesses circulate. These two categories are cash 
related, because a very little proportion of the business transactions is settled 
through bank accounts, while debit cards are not used and use of credit cards has 
started only recently in Albania. Normally a company’s expenses are some other 
company’s revenues, Albanian or foreign (import payments). Hence to avoid 
double-counting only the difference between income and expenses is considered 
to be relevant for the FCC calculation.8 From the survey results, we calculate that 
the currency mismatch between revenues and expenses is 41%. This figure is a 
percentage of total revenues. We assume that the total value of revenues for these 
businesses is the share of GDP that they hold.  
 
The estimated GDP for September 2005 is 823,197.41 million Leks. Given that 
manufacturing, services and construction businesses constitute approximately 
75.1 percent of Albanian GDP, or 618,221.25 million Leks in September 2005,9 
after taking money velocity into account, the amount of currency circulating in 
the businesses is 441,828.20 million Leks. Thus the level of foreign currency 




                                                 
8 It can be argued that some of these expenses might be wages payments, but wages in Albania are 
generally set in Albanian Lek. On the other hand, some of the expenses might go into other non-
business sector payments, therefore our measure might be downward biased. 
9 Datasource: Bank of Albania website.   - 15 - 
Table 10: FCC Calculation 
Estimated GDP September  823,197.41 
Total revenue for manufacturing, services and construction businesses 
(75.1% of GDP) 
618,221.25 
Currency in circulation after velocity of money January 2006 (GDP/1.4)  441,828.20 
Revenue in foreign currency calculated from the currency mismatch 





An extreme form of euroisation is the indexation of wages and prices. The 
indexation of wages and prices in foreign currency normally occurs after 
extensive euroisation of assets and cash has taken place. It would be too 
ambitious to look for clear signs of this form of euroisation in Albania, when 
labour contracting procedures are still weak and negotiations between workers 
and employers are generally little organised. A recent survey shows that most of 
the wages in Albania are paid in local currency. However, both workers and 
employers pay attention to the exchange rate level when salaries are revised.  This 
could be a weak form of indexation, reflecting the fears of exchange rate pass 
through even in short term. A stronger form of indexation is observed in the real 
estate market where virtually all prices and transactions take place in foreign 
currency. These early signs of extreme euroisation support the existence of a 
more excessive level of euroisation than the previously estimated moderate levels. 
 
For the estimation of euroisation, we use the business survey implied FCC. The 
results on FCC, when using the businesses sample, are drastically different from 
those obtained from the individuals’ survey. This does not come as surprise, given 
the above discussion and wide anecdotal evidence on the use of the foreign 
currency to settle major transactions instead of small day to day expenses.10 One 
only needs to read the daily newspapers to realise that rents, car prices, flight 
tickets and holiday package prices are all quoted in Euros. Therefore, the FCC 
and euroisation measure based on the businesses survey reflects much better the 
level of foreign currency in use in the Albanian economy. 
 
EI = 
FCC + Foreign Currency Deposits  =  
181,149.56 + 153429.28   = 45%
 
       Total Money  566162.12 + 181,149.56 
 
CSI = 
       Foreign Currency in Circulation                      = 
             181,149.56          = 56%
 
             Currency Outside Bank (domestic and foreign)       141477.93+ 181,149.56  
              
 
The estimated euroisation level implied by the businesses’ survey is high, 
approximately 45 percent. The amount of foreign currency circulating outside 
banks is about 56 percent of total currency outside banks, and it is higher in 
absolute value than what Sojli (2004) estimated. The difference might be due to 
the increase in remittances as well as an increase in trade in the last three years.11 
                                                 
10 By law in Albania it is allowed to contract in foreign currency. 
11 From the Balance of Payments statistics, remittances and imports have doubled, while exports 
have tripled in absolute value from Sept ’02- June ’o5.    - 16 - 
 
3. Policy implications 
Although euroisation in Albania to date has been regarded as moderate compared 
to other countries in the region (e.g. Croatia), our estimation shows that it could 
be significantly higher and cannot be disregarded for its inherent risks and 
implications on monetary policy. The major concern relates to the exchange rate 
risk that high euroisation imposes on the economy. In this environment, the 
central bank becomes rather sensitive to exchange rate volatility even under a 
free floating regime. On the other hand, free floating is indispensable for 
pursuing an independent monetary policy, which is a crucial argument for 
holding to individual money. One could then argue that euroisation restricts the 
monetary policy role as a shock absorber and therefore, the scope for keeping 
flexible exchange rates or even a domestic currency.  
 
In the case of Western Balkans countries that eventually will have to give up their 
local currencies for the Euro, the efforts to promote confidence in the domestic 
currency could be further undermined by the limited time left to make use of the 
consequent benefits. Put this way, an earlier euroisation may seem a good 
alternative to discretionary monetary policy. This point is strongly made by 
Dornbusch (2001), “… even though membership in the European Union (EU) is 
clearly on the horizon, the larger candidate countries so far remain attached to 
discretionary exchange rate regimes, forsaking the readily available benefits of 
unilaterally adopting the Euro”. Calvo (2001) also argues that liability 
dollarisation is per se a good reason to move towards de jure dollarisation 
because of the currency mismatch risks. Friedman, one of the most prominent 
advocates of flexible exchange rates, agrees that in the case of small countries: “… 
the best policy would be to eschew the revenue from money creation, to unify its 
currency with the currency of a large, relatively stable developed country with 
which it has close economic relations, and impose no barriers to the movement of 
prices, wages, and interest rates” [Money and Economic Development, (Praeger, 
1973, p. 59)]. His debate with Robert Mundell, the famous promoter of single 
currency areas, is mostly about the large countries or areas that may not have a 
viable option of a credible anchor currency. Putting aside the global debate of 
flexible vs. fixed exchange rates, which is beyond the scope of this paper, one 
important point coming out of these discussions is that euroisation/dollarisation 
could be a good solution for small countries.  
 
The idea of a rapid introduction of Euro is not new. It has been raised as early as 
ten years ago by several economists and politicians of the new accession countries 
and of the Western Balkan countries. The EU officials have not been particularly 
supportive of early euroisation. The main argument put forward has been the 
need of a nominal convergence before adopting the Euro in order to preserve the 
stability of European Monetary Union. 
 
According to the traditional theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Mundell, 1961) 
certain conditions should be met before entering any currency area, the most 
important being labour, capital and goods mobility. In other words this means   - 17 - 
openness and flexibility of markets that allow for other adjustments channels to 
substitute for the loss of monetary policy flexibility. Later on, the literature has 
pointed out that the issue of euroisation/dollarisation may not be a simple cost-
benefit exercise between fixed and floating regimes,12 and the answer could be far 
from definitive. The creation of the Euro-Zone seems to have defied the 
theoretical and empirical uncertainty of currency areas. Of course, EMU 
countries have been cautious about putting certain pre-conditions to increase the 
chances for Euro area success. These conditions known as ‘convergence criteria’ 
consist in, (1) price stability, (2) fiscal soundness, (3) exchange rate stability, and 
(4) long term interest rate convergence. Based on this precautionary approach, 
EU’s position on euroisation has been very clear: "...  “euroisation” would run 
counter to the underlying economic reasoning of EMU in the Treaty, which 
foresees the eventual adoption of the euro as the endpoint of a structured 
convergence process within a multilateral framework" (European Commission, 
2001). This means that countries outside the Euro-area are left only with the 
option of fixed and quasi-fixed exchange rates or currency boards. These 
alternatives, however, have proven to be unsustainable and in developing 
countries have often led to currency crises due to large and volatile capital flows 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Osakwe and Schembri, 1998). 
 
The debate on euroisation/dollarisation was revived by some new versions of the 
currency areas theory by Frankel and Rose (1998). They argued that 
preconditions for entering single currency areas are endogenous rather than 
exogenous to these arrangements, i.e. integration and convergence occur after 
entry in a currency area. Rose (2000) also provides some econometric evidence 
that two countries sharing a common currency trade far more with each other 
than comparable countries with different currencies. His evidence is criticised on 
the grounds that his sample is mostly made of small size countries (Winkler, et al. 
2004). However, this criticism does not challenge the validity of new OCA theory 
in the case of small countries. 
 
While the debate about the real benefits of euroisation is far from over, at the risk 
of oversimplification we may conclude that theoretical and empirical arguments 
seems to be more compelling for small countries like those in Western Balkan. 
Therefore, we try a very rough exercise to see the balance of weight between costs 
and benefits for Albania. We do not examine all issues related to euroisation, 
hence do not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the pros and cons associated 
with Albanian euroisation. We try to asses the most salient arguments used to 
advocate or reject early euroisation, starting with the level of integration between 
the EU and Albanian markets that justify the benefits of entering an OCA in the 
first place.  
 
Trade, financial and business cycle integration 
The higher the degree of integration of an economy with the anchor country the 
greater the benefits of exchange rate pegging, as transaction cots diminish (Rose, 
                                                 
12 See for example the case of Mexico in the Special Issue of Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking – May 2001 Part 2, “Global Monetary Integration”.   - 18 - 
2000; Frankel and Rose, 2002). From Table 10, we see that the Albanian trade to 
GDP ratio has reached more than 60 percent, while more than 80 percent of total 
trade is with EU countries (Figure 6). Although, in relation to other countries in 
the region it may not seem the most open economy that could benefit out of an 
OCA, as exports are expected to increase with time the advantages of removing 
exchange rate uncertainty will become more and more obvious. 
 
Table 10: The ratio of trade to GDP and the trade concentration indexes 
Country  (Exp. + 
Imp.)/GDP  rank 
Exp. 
Concentration 






Albania 61.28  19  0.292  3  0.063  16 
Armenia  81.67  15  0.434  1  0.192  2 
Poland 47.31  22  0.084  19  0.065  15 
Turkey 58.63  20  0.094  17  0.078  8 
Croatia  103.93  11  0.119  13  0.072  11 
Czech Rep.  127.83  5  0.108  14  0.074  10 
Romania  71.56  17  0.122  11  0.066  14 
Serbia  67.51  18  0.091  18  0.071  12 
Slovak Rep.  157.58  3  0.136  8  0.076  9 
B&H 84.41  14  -     -    
Bulgaria 116.19  7  0.104  16  0.154  4 
Cyprus 40.88  23  0.188  6  0.090  6 
Estonia 157.99  2  0.122  12  0.067  13 
Hungary 114.5  8  0.130  10  0.087  7 
Latvia 103.99  10  0.169  7  0.058  17 
Lithuania 113.78  9  -     -   
Macedonia 88.62  13  0.284  5  0.176  3 
Slovenia 119.32  6  0.108  15  0.057  19 
Source : Various  
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Diversification of production and consumption 
Low concentration of production and exports could lead to more dire effects of a 
shock to the Albanian economy, because it does not offer any comparative   - 19 - 
advantage that would provide long-term interest from foreign investors. 
Production is quite diversified, while exports mainly depend on the cheap cost of 
labour and not any specific well developed industry. This would be an argument 
against a free floating exchange rate. 
 
As with regards to financial integration, a large share of foreign direct 
investments (5 percent of GDP) in Albania comes from EMU countries. 
Furthermore, several of the 17 commercial banks are branches of large European 
banks. The largest bank, that has approximately 70 percent of the deposit market, 
is an Austrian bank, Raiffeisen Bank.  
 
Albania’s highly concentrated trade with EU countries implies that it should keep 
the option of flexible exchange rates open to avoid the contagion of negative 
shocks from its main partners. However, given the high degree of integration of 
Albanian trade and financial markets with the EU countries, we can infer that 
business cycles ought to be correlated as well, if not now very soon in the future, 
when the markets will integrate further. 
 
Moving beyond integration, the major drawback of entering a currency area is the 
loss of monetary policy flexibility to deal with asymmetric shocks. Monetary 
policy is a particularly valuable device when there are obvious differences in the 
business cycles between countries. There are good reasons to expect asymmetries 
in the business cycles of EU countries and Western Balkans. The economic 
structure of these countries is noticeably different, because Western Balkans 
countries are much more labour intensive economies and more commodity 
dependent than EU countries. However, the role of monetary policy depends on 
several factors starting from the effectiveness of monetary policy as shock 
absorber. In particular there are several structural developments that make the 
transmission mechanism very unstable on top of the uncertainty of 
understanding it in the first place. (See Box 2 for efforts in understanding and 
explaining monetary transmission mechanism in Albania.) Therefore countries 
like Albania may have to wait a considerable amount of time before they start to 
make an effective use of monetary policy tools. However, by then, most probably 
the economic structure will have converged towards that of EU countries 
reducing the importance of cyclical monetary policy. 
 
BOX 2: Understanding Albanian Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Some efforts 
 
Understanding of the Albanian Monetary Transmission Mechanism has led several authors to 
look closely at different stages of reform. A paper by McNeilly and Schiesser-Gachnang (1998) 
was among the first to explain the inflation process in the early years of transition. According to 
the authors the contribution of price liberalisation to overall inflation was large, a success which 
was later confirmed by the behaviour of core inflation. Domac and Elbirt (1998) used Granger 
causality tests to conclude that money and nominal exchange rates drive overall inflation, while 
net credit to government has a significant impact on the relative price of non traded services. 
 
Kalra (1998) in an early effort to explain the effectiveness of monetary policy, used a simple two 
equation analytical framework covering the goods and money markets to explain relationships 
between prices, money, exchange rates and interest rates during 1993-1997. The paper showed 
that money demand was homogenous to the price level, inversely related to the expected   - 20 - 
depreciation of the exchange rate and positively related to the interest rate and the level of 
economic activity. The author discovered back then the tendency of real exchange rate to 
appreciate until 1997. Also empirical evidence showed that adjustment to disturbances was fast. 
Later, Rother 2000 reiterated some of these findings and went beyond in looking into how the 
persistent changes in relative prices may contribute to movements of the aggregate price level. 
The author investigated some of the factors that drive Albania’s inflation performance and 
suggested that monetary policy should allow for some positive inflation.  
 
Looking at the empirical evidence from another prospective through an examination of trends in 
the key macro variables, based on both monthly and quarterly data, Muco, Sanfey and Luci, 
(2001) show several things. First, there is only a weak correlation at best between monetary 
targets and either inflation or output. Second, quarterly series on cement and electricity 
production are loosely correlated with official (annual) growth rates in GDP, but a series on fuel 
consumption bears no relation to output. Third, exchange rate stability and price stability are 
closely related, indicating that the exchange rate is a key indicator for inflationary expectations. A 
vector autoregression model (VAR) shows the interaction effects between the changes in money 
supply and inflation. Some evidence of two-way causality is present, but in general, the results 
confirm that the link between money supply and inflation before 2000 was weak, and the level of 
inflation is largely a function of other variables. 
 
Samiei (2003) attempts to examine monetary policy using an interest rate rule. Based on Taylor 
rule the author analyses whether the Bank of Albania has responded systematically to economic 
development in setting policy interest rate. Although he finds some support for this hypothesis, 
the results are only indicative given the structural shifts in the Albanian economy and data 
deficiencies. Nonetheless, the author recognises that while Taylor rule is based on interest rate 
response to demand shocks, inflation in Albania is substantially influenced by supply shocks. He 
recognises the monetary targeting as a necessity given the weaknesses of interest rate 
transmission mechanisms. 
 
Vladkova-Hollar (2000) analyses closely the causes and consequences of the real exchange rate 
appreciation. Although a real appreciation and an initial decline in net exports seems consistent 
with other transition experiences especially in the context of strong external inflows and growth, a 
further appreciation under a plausible decline of inflows needs to be treated carefully and 
accompanied with an extended export base. Supported by tentative econometric analysis the 
author suggests that the impact of the appreciation on the trade balance of Albania has been 
small. She argues that the effect of real exchange rate on exports has been weak, while large 
financial inflows, namely remittances, have influenced the demand for imports pushing upwards 
real exchange rates. 
 
Muco, Sanfey and Taci (2003) try to see the correlations between changes in money supply (M1), 
inflation, and the level of the exchange rate. They find very little correlation between money 
supply and the price level. For example, money growth was robust in 1994-95 when annual 
inflation was falling rapidly to single-digit levels, whereas money growth declined in 1997 when 
inflation shot up during the pyramid scheme crisis. Movements in the supply of money are likely 
to have been driven by changes in money demand rather than activist monetary policy by the 
central bank. However, the charts demonstrate a strong link between exchange rate stability and 
inflation. In fact, empirical evidence in Haderi et al. (1999) and Muço et al. (1999) demonstrates 
that the exchange rate and remittances explain much more of the variation in inflation than 
changes in the money supply does.  
 
In a more recent attempt Peeters ( 2 0 0 5 )  c h a l l e n g e s  t h e  p e r c e p tion that exchange rate pass-
through is the main channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Albania. She finds 
that its importance has declined over time as other channels such as credit channel and wage 
channel are gaining some grounds.  
 
   - 21 - 
If we retain the traditional OCA criteria exogeneity view, it is necessary to 
determine whether other adjustment channels and mechanisms exist, to 
substitute for the loss of monetary policy independence, which could potentially 
be valuable.  
 
Price and wage rigidities 
Flexible prices and wages would be a good substitute for monetary policy, in 
times of shock. Shocks could be absorbed by changes in wages and prices, and 
changes in the interest rates would not be needed to boost the economy. It is an 
empirical fact that prices and wages are fairly inflexible in the short-run 
(depending on how often contracts between employees and employers are re-
written and prices revised). Nonetheless, in Albania, there have been mixed 
signals about the flexibility of prices and wages. The speed of adjustment after 
major shocks in 1992 and 1997 could be interpreted as evidence of flexibility in 
either price and/or wage adjustments. This is partly due to low unions’ power 
combined with a relatively liberal market economy approach. If such an 




High factor mobility would help in taming the effects of a shock to the economy, 
because labour resources released due to a shock can move and work in other 
countries, and provide the income needed to help the economic recovery. Factor 
mobility in Albania is fairly high, due to a large proportion of the population 
living and working in the neighbouring countries, Greece and Italy, as well as in 
other countries in the EU. The economic impact of factor movements is large, 
since remittances and income from seasonal labour abroad form a large and 
continuous share of the Albanian GDP, as shown in Figure 7.  
 











Source: Bank of Albania, Instat. 
 
From this short analysis it seems the nominal or even real convergence issue 
between Albania and the Euro-Area does not pose excessive risk of destabilising 
either side to the point of offsetting the benefits of an early euroisation. In more 
technical terms two other often mentioned costs of giving up individual money   - 22 - 
are the loss of segniorage income, and absence of lender of last resort. 
Segniorage, according to Schobert (2001), may not be that important for the 
discussion of costs and benefits of euroisation. However, the costs of introducing 
the new currency could be considerable, estimated at above 10 percent of GDP. 
The lender of last resort also is considered to be a very important safety net 
measure to be sacrificed in face of potential financial system crises. Both these 
costs could make the unilateral euroisation much less optimal compared to the 
regular path of adopting Euro. The option of unilateral euroisation it is not 
simply undesirable but also unrealistic. There might be several reasons for this 
especially the insufficient level of gross international reserves in Albania which 
can hardly cover the cash in circulation let alone other aggregates like M2 or even 
less M3.  
 
Is there any third realistic option that enables the utilization of the advantages of 
an early euroisation? Lavasseur’s (2004) ‘consensual’ euroisation seems to be one 
solution. This proposal consist in an earlier agreement of euroisation with EU by 
giving up some rights on monetary policy decision-making of the euro-area, as an 
alternative to the adoption of euro under the regular path foreseen in the EU 
treaty. While the details of such proposal may need further research and 
refinements, it is a good example of how EU institution could accelerate the 
integration, especially of the late comers.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Euroisation is spontaneously taking place in many candidate countries like 
Albania, not simply because of monetary policy, or several other differences, as 
much as due to the close links these economies hold with EU - 70 percent of Alb. 
exp/imp with Italy and Greece, 30 percent of labour force is estimated to be 
working abroad. To ensure some flexibility these countries have let open the 
option of euroisation – holding FX deposits/loans, and/or carrying out 
transitions in euros. Therefore intentionally or unintentionally euroisation has 
become an accepted phenomenon among these countries. 
 
A re-estimation of currency substitution level of the Albanian economy by 
including the currency in circulation has shown that the level of 
euroisation/dollarisation could be much higher than it was previously thought. In 
particular our assessment highlights the high reliance of businesses on foreign 
currency while local currency is mostly used in daily transactions. This dual 
currency economy bears high exchange rate risks usually categorised under the 
label of 'fear of floating' due to liability mismatches economic agents hold. In 
order to minimise these risks, controlling exchange rate appears to be an 
appropriate policy. However, pegging the exchange rate of a fast changing 
economy runs high risks of leading to costly misalignments. Therefore, while 
sharp changes of exchange rate need to be avoided, regimes like inflation 
targeting that allow exchange rate to adjust in line with its fundamentals, may 
strike a better balance between the above two sets risks.  
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However, there could be more. While for import-export companies a multi-
currency balance sheet is common there are many other businesses and contracts 
taking place in foreign currencies simply due to speculative reasons, e.g. interest 
rate differentials. It is this type of transaction that should be avoided and 
restricted to minimise the risks of euroisation. Measures to reduce the speculative 
part of 'euroisation' may not be that different from measures to reduce cash 
economy. Here one could mention the enforcement of transactions in domestic 
currency especially of durable goods and long term contracts and of loans. 
 
As EU integration of Balkan countries is approaching they will eventually face the 
decision of entering EMU. We have argued that an early adoption of Euro after 
joining EU for a highly euroised country like Albania could be beneficiary to 
anchor inflation expectation and eliminate exchange rate risks without sacrificing 
much of the available flexibility. In this regard, the regular path of adopting Euro 
through the Maastricht convergence criteria could be a lengthy and unnecessarily 
complicated process. Maintaining a stable exchange rate around a ‘central parity’ 
for a developing country could be a trivial exercise for at least two reasons. In an 
economy where most of the decisions are made in Euros, exchange rate may not 
necessarily be a reflection of fundamentals. Besides, exchange rate especially 
during ERM2 commitment could be subject to speculative attacks that weaken 
exchange rate links with fundamental further.  
 
Concerning EU officials’ worries that a premature joining of EMU could 
jeopardize the stability of Euro-Area, we have looked at some of the preconditions 
that OCA theories put forth for a successful merging such as, inflation 
differentials, business cycles synchronicity, fiscal policy, etc.. Our analysis of 
these elements, shows that Albania is characterised by flexible markets with a 
high degree of integration with those of the European Union meeting some of the 
criteria of OCA theories. 
 
Regardless of which theory the analysis is based on for a small country like 
Albania the alternative of an early euroisation seems to be an appealing solution. 
De jure unilateral euroisation is always an option but it could be both technically 
and politically a complex issue. Therefore a ‘consensual’ euroisation that trades 
off some of the rights of joining EMU for more flexible convergence criteria 
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Appendix A - Survey of firms (Business Confidence Index) 
 





2.  Approximately, how much of your activity is carried out in foreign currency 







3.  For the activities that you carry out in foreign currency, what currency do you 





4.  Please rank from 1 to 5, according to importance, what are the reasons for 
using foreign currency. 
a)  The specific activity (import/export) 
b)  Minimisation of exchange rate risk 
c)  Transaction/Procedural costs are lower if carried out in foreign currency 
d) Interest  rate  differentials 
e) Others,  specify 
 
5.  What has been the tendency of your use of the foreign currency since your 
business started operations? 
a) Increasing 
b) Decreasing 
c) The same 
 




c) The  same 
 
7.  If you request credit from a bank you would prefer to have it: 
1)  In foreign currency 
2) In  Lek? 
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8.  Please rank from 1 to 5, according to importance, what does your preference 
for foreign currency depend on? 
a) Interest  rates 
b)  The type of business 
c) Exchange  rate  risk 
d)  Facilities and profitability 
e) Other 
 
9. Would the adoption of the euro as the legal tender in Albania help your 
business? Please explain your answer. 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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Appendix B - Survey of individuals (Individuals’ Confidence Index) 
 
1. What is the percentage of the following expenses in your annual budget and 
which currency do you use for transactions? 
Lek Foreing  Currency 
a)  food      ______    %       
b) utilities  (electricity, water)   ______  %       
c)  clothes    ______    %       
d)  transportation      ______  %       
e)  services/holidays      ______  %       
f)  home      ______    %       
g)  other      ______    %       
 
2.  How do you think this percentage will change in the future (next 3 years) 
 
Up Down  Unchanged 
a)  food              
b) utilities  (electricity,  water)            
c) clothes                
d) transportation              
e) services/holidays              
f)  home              
g)  other              
 
3.  Which interest rates are the most important to you, ranked from 1 to 5? 
 
a)  Bank deposits in Lek  
b)  Bank deposits in foreign currency (EUR/USD) 
c) Government  securities 
d)  Bank loans in Lek 
e)  Bank loans in foreign currency  
f) Other  ______________________________________ 
 
4.  How do you hold your savings? Please indicate current percentages. 
a)  Cash  Lek       ____  % 
b)  Bank Deposits Lek        ____ % 
c)  Foreign currency cash     ____ % 
d)  Bank deposits in foreign currency ____ % 
e) Government  securities      ____  % 
f)  Other        ____  % 
 
5.  What is the ratio Lek/foreign currency of your current wealth? 
 
6.  How do you think this ratio will change in the future? 
a) Increase 
b) Decrease 
c) Will  not  change 